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Structural power in comparative political 
economy: perspectives from policy 
formulation in Latin America
Abstract: Structural power is a critical variable that merits more extensive and 
more explicit attention in Latin American political economy and in comparative 
politics more broadly. Assessing structural power in conjunction with its counter-
part, instrumental power, can provide strong leverage for explaining variation in 
policy outcomes that affect business interests. However, structural power must be 
carefully defined and operationalized in order to capture its core attributes and 
nuances. This task requires wedding the concept’s “structural” underpinnings 
with policymakers’ perceptions and anticipated reactions. Moreover, the relation-
ship between structural power and instrumental power must be carefully theo-
rized. While these concepts encompass distinct channels through which business 
exerts influence, the two types of power may be mutually reinforcing. I argue that 
business interests shape policy outcomes when either their structural power or 
their instrumental power is strong, yet business influence will be more exten-
sive and more consistent when structural power and instrumental power are both 
strong. However, electoral incentives, and more importantly, popular mobiliza-
tion, can counteract business power. I illustrate these theoretical points with 
a case study of Chile’s 2014 tax reform proposal, a major policy initiative with 
important distributive consequences that received international press attention.
DOI 10.1515/bap-2014-0047
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1  Introduction
Shortly after taking office in 2014, Chilean president Michelle Bachelet introduced 
a sweeping tax reform proposal designed to raise revenue from wealthy capital 
owners in order to finance education reform and reduce inequality. Newly elected 
MP Gabriel Boric, a former leader of the student movement that was responsible 
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for placing these issues on the national agenda through a wave of mass protests, 
offered the following reflections on the subsequently negotiated compromise bill, 
which was much less objectionable than the original proposal from business’s 
perspective:
When entrepreneurs speak out and act accordingly, it’s shameful – the power that business 
has is tremendous. Here entrepreneurs said that there would be no investment, that there 
would be a slowdown and unemployment would increase. They say it but they are also those 
who do it. That is, if there is more unemployment or a slowdown it is because they themselves 
stop investing. So they have a kind of negotiating position that is disgraceful for a democracy.1
These remarks highlight the salience of business power in modern Latin America 
and offer a cogent lay interpretation of business’s privileged position in capital-
ist democracies. As scholars of business politics have observed, “capital votes 
twice: once through the organized pressure it can bring to bear on the political 
process, again through its investment decisions.”2 These two modes of influence 
correspond to the classic concepts of instrumental power and structural power. 
Broadly speaking, instrumental power relates to business actors’ deliberate polit-
ical engagement, whereas structural power stems from investors’ profit-maximiz-
ing responses to market signals.
Several considerations suggest that business power, and structural power 
in particular, should occupy a central place in research on contemporary Latin 
American political economy. First, extensive if often incomplete market reforms 
in the 1980s and 1990s moved Latin America away from a statist model character-
ized by heavy public ownership, government planning, and state intervention, 
toward a neoliberal model that places much greater agency in the hands of the 
private sector.3 Second, Latin America exhibits a hierarchical variety of capital-
ism dominated by large, diversified, family-owned domestic business groups.4 
Not only is capital ownership tremendously concentrated, but a small number of 
wealthy families in essence chart the course of the economy from their perch atop 
the private-sector hierarchy. Third, Latin American has become increasingly inte-
grated into the global economy and exposed to mobile capital. Investors’ ability 
to exit greatly enhances their influence via structural power. Examples illustrat-
ing the devastating consequences of capital flight include Mexico’s 1994 peso 
crisis and Argentina’s 2001 crisis.
1 Gabriel Boric, quoted in Mostrador, July 14, 2014.
2 Haggard, Maxfield, and Schneider (1997: p. 38). See also Lindblom (1977).
3 E.g. Etchemendy (2011).
4 Schneider (2013).
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Latin American scholars have by no means overlooked these developments. 
Constraints imposed by capital mobility, exit options, and market disciplin-
ing mechanisms – all of which fall within the realm of structural power – have 
received prominent attention in research on market reform, social policy, and 
redistribution in Latin American democracies, to name a few important topics in 
political economy.5 Yet contemporary scholarship rarely invokes the concept of 
structural power directly, and authors do not always adequately capture its core 
attributes and nuances.
I argue that structural power is a variable that merits more extensive and 
more explicit attention in Latin American political economy and comparative 
politics more broadly. Assessing structural power in conjunction with its counter-
part, instrumental power, can provide strong leverage for explaining variation in 
policy outcomes that affect business interests. Indeed, analyzing structural and 
instrumental power is essential if we are to fully understand the multiple means 
and mechanisms of business influence and the extent to which democratic gov-
ernments can formulate and enact economic policy autonomously of business 
interests.
This paper proceeds in four parts. Section 2 addresses issues of defining, 
operationalizing and measuring structural power. Section 3 examines the rela-
tionship between structural power and instrumental power, which has not been 
extensively theorized. Section 4 considers how electoral incentives and popular 
mobilization can counteract business power. Section 5 examines the role that 
structural power in combination with instrumental power played in shaping the 
outcome of Chile’s 2014 tax reform proposal, a major policy initiative with impor-
tant distributive consequences that received international press attention.
2  Defining and operationalizing structural power
Structural power as originally theorized by authors including Block and Lindb-
lom arises from the fact that in market societies, states depend on private-sector 
agents to invest in ways that generate growth, employment, and prosperity. Firms 
and capital owners respond to government policies by changing their invest-
ment decisions in accord with their own individual profit-maximizing objectives. 
These individual decisions can have consequential aggregate economic effects. 
If policymakers anticipate that a reform or a broader policy agenda will provoke 
5 E.g. Hirschman (1970); Maxfield (1990); Mahon (1996); Thacker (2000); Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo (2001); Kaplan (2013); Campello (2015).
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reduced investment or other undesirable aggregate economic consequences,6 they 
may rule it out in order to avert those undesirable consequences. If policymakers 
implement policies that subsequently appear to elicit negative economic effects, 
they may reform those policies in an effort to restore business confidence and 
productive investment activity. In either scenario, investors, firms, and capital 
owners influence policy decisions without need for concerted political action. 
Instead, the market coordinates their individual economic decisions.7
This familiar formulation of structural power is logical and compelling, yet it 
is posed at a high level of generality that is not conducive for comparative analy-
sis.8 Structural power needs to be operationalized in a way that elucidates vari-
ation over time, across countries, among different economic sectors, and across 
policy areas. This task requires integrating the concept’s “structural” underpin-
nings with policymakers’ perceptions and anticipated reactions.
As the term suggests, structural power is grounded in the “structural” eco-
nomic position that private-sector agents occupy in capitalist societies. At an 
aggregate level of analysis, structural power depends on the relative weight of 
the private sector vs. the state in the economy; if the public sector dominates, 
business’s structural power will tend to be weak.9 Similarly, business’s structural 
power will be weaker in resource-rich countries during commodity booms where 
public enterprises dominate production. If the relevant level of analysis involves 
a particular sector, such as finance or construction, structural power will tend 
to be stronger where that sector contributes a large share of GDP, generates sig-
nificant employment, or has multiple linkages to other sectors that amplify the 
economic impact of its investment decisions. The financial sector often occupies 
an important “structural” position given its role in sustaining productive sectors 
throughout the economy.10 Likewise, where capital is mobile, all else equal, struc-
tural power will tend to be stronger since investors can exit a jurisdiction that 
implements unfavorable policies.
6 Structural power more broadly can stem from market-coordinated individual decisions about 
levels of production, employment, or other such economic activities. I use the term investment 
throughout for expediency and because investment is often understood as proximate to other 
consequential business decisions such as hiring or firing.
7 As Winters (1996: pp. 14–15) observes: “the atomized nature of the investor’s response is pre-
cisely what makes it so devastating. If individual calculations resulted…in …investors relocating 
their assets abroad, the destructive consequences of such a move… could be both anticipated 
and prevented if investors were organized and exchanged information on their plans.”
8 Hacker and Pierson (2002).
9 These conditions often prevail in Africa (Handley 2008).
10 Woll (2014).
Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/26/15 3:58 PM
Structural power in comparative political economy      415
Such “structural” factors are relatively straightforward to operationalize and 
measure, and they are often treated as important explanatory variables in their 
own right. A large literature seeks to evaluate the effects of capital mobility and 
market integration on tax rates and welfare spending through large-N analysis;11 
regressions commonly include a standard index of capital account openness 
along with FDI and portfolio investment. Turning to market reform literature, 
Etchemendy draws on “structural” variables including the “economic power” 
of industrial-sector businesses to explain models of economic adjustment. He 
argues that the Argentine government selectively compensated dominant busi-
ness groups in sectors where the domestic bourgeoisie was economically strong 
relative to the state at the end of the inward-oriented industrialization period. His 
indicators of economic power include volume of sales, profits, and value gener-
ated in relation to the sector’s concentration (number of firms).12 Similarly, recent 
research on patent policy in Latin America identifies the domestic pharmaceuti-
cal sector’s size and market strength as key explanatory variables. Shadlen finds 
that countries where domestic pharmaceutical sectors were well-developed prior 
to the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS) did not adopt maximalist patent regimes.13
While many of these studies make compelling arguments, variables such as 
capital mobility and economic importance are not always adequate for explain-
ing policy change. In my research on business power and tax politics in Latin 
America, I find that these variables do not accurately predict when and to what 
extent business has managed to resist increased taxation of income and wealth.14 
The crux of the problem is that economic importance and capital mobility on their 
own serve as poor proxies for the classic concept of structural power.15 On the one 
hand, the fact that capital can exit does not necessarily imply that it will exit. 
Policies may create different signals for investors in different contexts, even when 
they impose clear costs on firms and capital owners. Consider taxation of inter-
est earnings: whereas it is the norm in most countries, Argentine governments 
have not ventured to enact this policy for fear that depositors would flee from 
the banks – a widely-held perception fostered by the country’s history of peri-
odic financial crises.16 The climate created by a broader set of policies affecting 
11 E.g. Wibbels and Arce (2003); Hart (2009) on taxes; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001); Ave-
lino, Brown, and Hunter (2005), on social spending.
12 Etchemendy (2011: pp. 78–85).
13 Shadlen (Accepted for publication).
14 Fairfield (2015).
15 Nor do they necessarily indicate strong instrumental power (Section 3).
16 Fairfield (2015: chapter 6).
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investors matters;17 for example, income tax increases enacted in the midst of 
extensive privatization reforms may cause little concern for investors, as was the 
case in Argentina during Menem’s first term in office,18 whereas investors may flee 
when leftist candidates lead in the polls, long before any redistributive policies 
are initiated.19 On the other hand, structural power does not require capital mobil-
ity. Even where assets are sunk, as in extractive resource sectors, the imperative 
of attracting new investment may shape the set of policies under consideration.20 
Likewise, businesses and sectors that play an important role in the economy do 
not always have strong structural power. For example, if commodity sectors are 
highly profitable, investment may continue despite substantial tax increases. 
Cases here are not restricted to extractive sectors in resource-dependent coun-
tries; Argentine governments were able to heavily tax soy from 2001 to 2008 
without deterring increased production.21
Furthermore, policymakers’ perceptions play a key role in how and when 
structural power acts. Expectations lie at the heart of economics, yet there is 
a large and often underappreciated margin of uncertainty in formal economic 
analysis. Predicting how investors will respond to a policy is often difficult, given 
the complexities of real-world economies and problems of incomplete informa-
tion. For example, Campello observes that in Latin America: “most financial 
markets are illiquid, asymmetric and volatile, making it hard for politicians to 
correctly anticipate investors’ behavior.”22 Moreover, economic models used to 
predict investor responses rely on multiple assumptions that may not hold as well 
as elasticity parameters that are empirically difficult to estimate.23 Even experts 
who agree on basic principles of orthodox economics may disagree on the likely 
economic impact of a given policy. Consider for example, the very different views 
about behavioral responses to progressive taxation advanced by the well-known 
economists Thomas Piketty and Martin Feldstein – whereas the latter cautioned 
that high marginal income tax rates create consequential work disincentives, the 
former argues that top marginal rates could be far higher without any negative 
consequences for growth or productivity.24 Policymakers’ perceptions clearly 
matter for agenda formulation, which takes place before any actual investment 
17 E.g. Hacker and Pierson (2002: p. 282); Gelleny and McCoy (2001); Garrett and Mitchell (2001).
18 Fairfield (2010: p. 55).
19 Campello (2015).
20 Winters (1996).
21 Fairfield (2011).
22 Campello (2015: p. 34).
23 E.g. Gruber and Saez (2000).
24 Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2011, 2014); Feldstein (1995).
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response can be observed. Yet perceptions matter even when disinvestment 
actually occurs. Experts may again disagree on the extent to which a particular 
policy is responsible for an investment slowdown relative to other policies or even 
international factors beyond the government’s control. The diagnosis matters for 
whether the particular policy in question is amended or rescinded in future itera-
tions of policymaking.
The centrality of policymakers’ perceptions and the difficulty of objectively 
identifying how investors will react in any given case pose complications for 
operationalizing structural power. I address the problem as follows.25 I score 
structural power as strong at the agenda formulation stage when evidence indi-
cates that policymakers perceived a credible (implicit) threat26 that a reform 
would lead to reduced investment with consequential aggregate economic 
impacts. If policymakers were not concerned over the investment response, I 
score structural power as weak at the agenda formulation stage. Where struc-
tural power keeps a policy off the agenda, further assessment of the underlying 
“objective” disinvestment threat is not possible – the counterfactual regarding 
what would have happened to investment cannot be observed.27 We may refer to 
“strong perceived structural power” in these cases, but the adjective carries little 
substantive import.28 However, where policymakers viewed structural power as 
weak and implemented the policy, observing changes in investment brings addi-
tional information that can be used to retrospectively re-assess structural power 
and update expectations about market responses during future cycles of policy-
making. In some cases, policymakers may have mistakenly perceived structural 
power as weak, and the advent of disinvestment may subsequently motivate them 
to alter the policy in question. In such cases, structural power operates through 
what I term a “realized disinvestment threat,” and for clarity, we may refer to 
“weak perceived structural power” during the prior agenda formulation stage. 
Of course, ascertaining why policymakers perceived structural power as weak or 
25 This discussion follows Table 2.2: Structural Power and Disinvestment Threats in Fairfield 
(2015: p. 45).
26 By “threat,” I refer to a significant risk, not to any explicit articulation of intent to disinvest 
or warnings of such consequences by business actors. The latter fall within the realm of in-
strumental power and may reflect business efforts to instrumentally enhance structural power 
(Section 3).
27 In game-theoretic terms, the decision node where business chooses how much to invest after 
the policy is enacted lies off the path of play.
28 It may be possible to reevaluate structural power if similar policies are implemented in a later 
period, for example, by a new government with different priorities (see Fairfield 2015: pp. 239, 
249–250 for Bolivian examples).
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strong, relating those perceptions back to the “structural” position of the relevant 
business actors, and if possible, assessing whether policymakers’ perceptions 
represented an accurate reading of the “objective” disinvestment threat are all 
important components of the explanatory enterprise.
To reiterate the key points, there is a large margin of uncertainty in analyz-
ing market reactions to policy change – economists, let alone policymakers, may 
not share common evaluations. It follows that there is no unambiguous measure 
of structural power, and in most cases it cannot be directly observed; structural 
power is always at least partly a matter of perception and interpretation. Policy-
makers’ perceptions regarding market responses therefore serve as an important 
empirical trace of structural power and the extent to which it influences policy 
decisions. We must also recognize that policymakers sometimes get it wrong – 
their expectations about how investors will respond, and/or their analyses of 
why investors responded to an enacted policy in a particular manner, may not 
be accurate.
If policymakers’ perceptions matter, we need to ascertain what those per-
ceptions were as well as the rationale and assumptions that gave rise to them; 
interviews can be extremely valuable to these ends. Economic training and ide-
ology will clearly affect expectations and interpretations regarding investment 
responses; behavioral economics and literature on cognitive biases may provide 
insights as well.29 However, the question of how perceptions are formed is clearly 
open for further investigation.
Political economists are often uncomfortable with folding policymakers’ per-
ceptions into the operationalization of structural power (the term itself fosters 
confusion in this regard). Yet if we do not, we are restricted to working with vari-
ables like economic importance and capital mobility that do not fully capture 
the core meaning of structural power and are not always adequate for explain-
ing how and when business influences policy decisions. It is worth emphasizing 
that perceptions are intrinsic in the classic formulation of structural power given 
the importance of anticipated reactions, as other authors have also recognized. 
Winters asserts: “issues of perception and anticipation are... critical to the actions 
of both investors and state leaders.”30 Hacker and Pierson likewise observe: “If 
influence depends on fear of disinvestment, then it will vary depending on how 
credible policy makers believe that threat to be” (emphasis added).31 Despite the 
29 See Weyland (2007) on cognitive bias in policy formulation.
30 Winters (1996: p. xv).
31 Hacker and Pierson (2002: p. 282).
Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/26/15 3:58 PM
Structural power in comparative political economy      419
importance of policymakers’ perceptions, however, structural power remains an 
attribute of business; it is rooted in the profit-maximizing logic followed by indi-
vidual private-sector agents. The private sector actors who can be said to “hold” 
structural power are whichever set of firms, investors, or producers are relevant 
when policymakers evaluate the economic consequences of a given policy.
The foregoing discussion suggests that structural power varies widely – not 
only across countries, economic sectors, and classes of investors, but also across 
distinct policy initiatives.32 All else being equal, structural power tends to be 
stronger when reforms entail radical changes, which are more likely to alter invest-
ment behavior and provoke negative reactions from the market than moderate or 
gradual changes. Structural power will also vary over time. For example, changes 
in government may bring in new policymakers who model investors’ market 
responses differently than their predecessors in office. Fluctuations in the state 
of the economy also drive temporal changes in structural power. Some authors 
argue that structural power is strongest during recessions, which focus attention 
on stimulating investment and job creation;33 others argue that structural power 
weakens after economic crisis, since additional disinvestment may have mar-
ginal effects beyond the damage already done.34 I argue that such relationships 
are highly variable. For example, crisis may either enhance or reduce business’s 
structural power with respect to a particular policy initiative. Argentina’s 2001 
crisis strengthened the financial sector’s structural power against taxing inter-
est earnings but undermined its structural power on tax agency access to bank 
information.35
Overall, I argue that structural power is a variable that takes on different 
values (from weak to strong) across policymaking episodes. Myriad factors affect 
how investors interpret and react to policy initiatives, as well as policymakers’ 
expectations about how they will respond. Broad shifts over the past several 
decades in the relative weight of the state versus the private sector in economic 
activity and levels of global capital mobility have set the scene for structural 
power to play a more significant role in policymaking, yet even in Latin America’s 
neoliberal era, structural power it is not the overwhelming force described in 
early business politics literature.
32 See Fairfield (2015: pp. 42–48) for elaboration of factors driving variation at these levels of 
analysis beyond those discussed here.
33 Smith (2000: pp. 148–149); Luger (2000: p. 31).
34 Block (1977); Vogel (1987); Hacker and Pierson (2002).
35 Fairfield (2015: chapter 6).
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3   Structural power in relation to instrumental 
power
Any analytical framework designed to study how business shapes policymaking 
must account for the multiple means and mechanisms through which business 
can exert influence. Structural power must therefore be assessed in conjunction 
with instrumental power, which stems from political resources that make delib-
erate actions to influence policy more effective. These political resources include 
favorable relationships with policymakers that enhance access and create bias in 
favor of business interests, such as informal ties to politicians and bureaucrats, 
appointment or election to government office, and core constituency relation-
ships with political parties36 (partisan linkages). Additional resources include 
organization, money, technical expertise, and media access, all of which place 
business in a stronger position to lobby, orchestrate collective action, command 
authority in policy debates, finance campaigns, and/or shape public opinion. It 
is important to stress that political activities like lobbying in and of themselves 
are not indicators of instrumental power. Rather, the specific relationships and 
resources identified above serve as indicators – “sources” of instrumental power 
– that help predict when business’s political engagement will be more effective.37
Of course, structural power also makes business’s deliberate political actions 
more effective, a point discussed further below. Business actors have a stronger 
bargaining position when policymakers perceive that postponing or relocating 
investment is in the economic self-interest of those actors. Yet structural power is 
conceptually distinct from instrumental power in that it is rooted in individual, 
profit-maximizing, market-coordinated investment decisions. This is the core 
feature of structural power that makes it exclusive to business. Labor unions and 
mass movements may also have sources of political power akin to instrumen-
tal power, through organization, relationships with political parties, or govern-
ment appointments. Yet there is no parallel for structural power. Labor unions 
can inflict economic damage with the aim of effecting policy change, but doing 
so requires organization and collective action; market forces create incentives for 
individuals to return to work.38
36 The core constituency is the group that matters most for the party’s political agenda and 
resources (not necessarily votes) (Gibson 1996).
37 This formulation draws on power resource theory to avoid the pitfalls of associating the ex-
ercise of power exclusively with overt actions. Influence may instead flow through anticipated 
reactions or act implicitly when policymakers share business’s objectives. See Fairfield (2015: pp. 
28–42) on operationalizing instrumental power.
38 E.g. Offe and Wisenthal (1980: p. 74).
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I argue that business interests shape policy decisions when either their struc-
tural power or their instrumental power is strong. For example, instrumental 
power in Chile during the early 2000s kept governments from legislating any-
thing but marginal tax increases, even in the absence of structural power; in 
contrast, structural power kept Argentine governments from eliminating an oth-
erwise technically and normatively unjustified tax exemption for interest earn-
ings despite the banks’ weak instrumental power after the 2001 crisis.39
Yet while either type of power is sufficient for business influence, business 
actors will get what they want more extensively and more consistently when 
structural power and instrumental power are both strong. There can be simple 
additive effects, where the two types of power can be thought of as forces acting 
in the same direction. Moreover, structural power and instrumental power can be 
mutually reinforcing, as elaborated below.
First, instrumental power may enhance structural power: business can 
actively use its sources of instrumental power to augment policymakers’ concern 
over investment (Figure 1A). Business lobbying and media campaigns may 
reinforce incipient concerns over investment, legitimate concerns harbored by 
subsets of policymakers with veto power, or even generate concern among poli-
cymakers who initially do not expect that a reform will induce negative economic 
consequences. Of course, business actors regularly argue that policies they dislike 
Instrumental
Power
Structural
Power
Media access
Technical expertise
Relationships
(e.g. informal ties,
partisan linkages)
Enhanced
concern among
policymakers
over investment
Enhanced business
access
Recruitment into
government
Institutionalized
consultation
Policymaker’s concern
over investment
Policymakers’ initiative
(A)  Instrumental enhancement
of structural power
Business initiative
(B)  Structural enhancement
of instrumental power
Figure 1: Reinforcing relationships between instrumental power and structural power.
39 Fairfield (2015: chaps. 2, 4, 6).
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will harm investment; they may even aim to inflate perceptions of their struc-
tural power in their quest to defeat such policies. But policymakers do not always 
believe those claims. The critical point is that strong instrumental power arising 
from political resources and relationships with policymakers makes it more likely 
that the latter will take business’s deliberate structural-power arguments seri-
ously instead of writing them off as a transparent strategy for promoting narrow 
self-interest rather than the public good. Money and media access help business 
amplify and disseminate the message. Strong relationships with political parties 
help bring business arguments to the center of debate in congress. Technical 
expertise confers authority and legitimacy, especially on complex issue areas 
where politicians lack capacity to independently evaluate claims that reform will 
harm investment.40
Second, structural power can enhance instrumental power (Figure 1B). Pol-
icymakers may grant business greater access and participation than would be 
expected given the latters’ extant sources of instrumental power when they are 
concerned a priori about market reactions. Lindblom’s assertion that given struc-
tural power, “businessmen cannot be left knocking at the doors of the political 
systems, they must be invited in” follows this logic. Structural power may even 
motivate policymakers to grant business new sources of instrumental power or to 
institutionalize and thereby strengthen existing sources of instrumental power. 
For example, concerns over investor confidence or attempts to reverse capital 
flight may lead governments to appoint finance ministers or central bank heads 
from business circles – such recruitment into government is a classic source of 
instrumental power. Campello documents contemporary Latin American cases 
of this phenomenon that ensued where leftist presidents faced currency crises 
precipitated by anti-market campaign platforms.
Aside from these mutually reinforcing relationships, strong power of one 
type during an initial period may translate into strong power of the other type 
in subsequent periods. Relationships with policymakers established in response 
to structural power (as discussed above) may provide business with enduring 
sources of instrumental power long after any credible threats of disinvestment 
have subsided.41 Conversely, strong instrumental power may help business secure 
40 Culpepper’s (2011: p. 178) argument that expertise gives business influence on low-salience 
issues draws on similar logic. See also Ziegler (1997) on technical expertise and power.
41 See, for example, Fairfield (2010: p. 52) on government-business concertation in Chile, and 
Campello (2015) on the political legacy of currency crises under Gutierrez (Ecuador) and Lula 
(Brazil).
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policies that enhance structural power in the future, for example, by limiting reg-
ulations that curtail exit options.42
It becomes harder to disentangle instrumental and structural power when 
business actors deliberately coordinate disinvestment or halt production with 
the express goal of forcing policy change, or even regime change. If we take 
market coordination as the defining attribute of structural power, such political 
collusion to inflict economic damage falls outside the domain of the concept. 
The market coordination mechanism is central to original conceptualizations 
of structural power. Block locates structural power in capitalists’ “narrow eco-
nomic rationality,” Przeworski and Wallerstein emphasize capital’s propensity to 
“blindly pursue narrow, private self interest,” and Haggard et al. identify a focus 
on private actors’ responses to market signals as central to structural approaches 
in Latin American politics.43 Winters similarly grounds structural power in: “The 
sum of investors’ separate calculations and actions as profit-driven actors in a 
market environment …investors need not consciously coordinate their actions 
to act in concert…”44 In contrast, politically-coordinated disinvestment, which I 
term a capital strike, imposes short-term costs on participants. The key distinc-
tion from disinvestment as an exercise of structural power is that capital strikes 
are “a deliberate tool of pressure, as opposed to a method of increasing expected 
return.”45 This conceptualization is analogous to labor strikes, which also require 
deliberate political coordination and impose costs on participants; if the term 
capital strike is applied to market-coordinated investment, as some authors do, 
the analogy is misleading.46
Culpepper and Reinke propose a more expansive definition of structural 
power that encompasses any influence that “flows directly from the role of the 
capital holder in the economy and its growth and employment capacities, not 
from the investment in lobbying offices or trade associations.”47 However, organi-
zation is a source of instrumental power – not structural power – that has played 
a key role in facilitating business protest in the economic arena, of which capital 
strikes are a familiar example. Such economic protest is more likely to occur 
42 E.g. Maxfield (1990) on business alliances promoting international financial integration in 
Mexico.
43 Block (1977: p. 19); Przeworski and Wallerstein (1988: p. 12); Haggard, Maxfield, and Schnei-
der (1997: p. 37).
44 Winters (1996: p. 2).
45 Mahon (1996: p. 20).
46 Offe and Wisenthal (1980: p. 79); Mahon (1996: p. 21).
47 Culpepper and Reinke (2014: p. 6).
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precisely where business associations are strong.48 Given the facilitating role of 
organization and the expressly political nature of such actions, I advocate locat-
ing capital strikes within the realm of instrumental power. These are political 
strategies that use action in the economic arena as leverage. Ultimately, however, 
what matters most for analytical purposes is identifying whether market coor-
dination or political coordination predominates. Governments’ assessments of 
which mechanisms operate affect how they respond to disinvestment and how 
long they are inclined to hold out before altering economic policies.
A few additional comments on the relationship between structural and 
instrumental power and the manner in which they act are in order. Structural 
and instrumental power are sometimes distinguished according to whether influ-
ence is indirect as opposed to direct or overt. Structural power is usually viewed 
as “indirectly” setting the agenda, with instrumental power coming into play 
through “overt” actions during later stages of policymaking.49 Yet both types of 
power may operate either directly or indirectly. Instrumental power may influ-
ence agenda formulation through anticipated reactions; policymakers may rule 
out options because they recognize that business has strong political resources 
that will make an initiative difficult to legislate, just as they may rule out options 
for fear of disinvestment. Likewise, structural power may operate after a policy 
proposal has been initiated. Legislators may perceive strong structural power 
even if the policy’s executive-branch authors do not anticipate negative inves-
tor reactions (see Section 5). And the mere announcement of a policy may elicit 
market-coordinated disinvestment, thereby motivating policymakers to update 
their assessment of structural power.
Empirically, distinguishing between instrumental power and structural 
power is non-trivial, since either or both may lead to the same policy outcome. 
However, process tracing, grounded in informal Bayesian analysis, is well-suited 
for analyzing cases where equifinality and multiple causal mechanisms may 
be at play.50 Evidence from interviews with policymakers and business actors, 
48 See Fairfield (2011). Economy-wide business associations coordinated business strikes in 
Guatemala, lockouts against Chávez in Venezuela, and politically-motivated disinvestment 
under Allende in Chile. If capital owners are few in numbers, collective action problems are 
easier to overcome, but divergent interests and heterogeneity may still lead an individual profit-
maximizing logic to preclude political coordination. This situation occurred among multination-
als in Bolivia when governments increased royalties and altered contracts. The multinationals 
engaged in little collective action beyond joint statements opposing government policy and ulti-
mately renegotiated their contracts independently. 
49 E.g. Hacker and Pierson (2002).
50 E.g. Bennett and Checkel (2015); Charman and Fairfield (2015).
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as well as internal government or business association documents and public 
records can provide a wealth of information for identifying causal mechanisms 
and assessing which of three relevant hypotheses is most likely in cases where 
policy outcomes reflect business interests: H1 – instrumental power allowed busi-
ness to get what it wanted, H2 – structural power motivated policymakers to take 
business interests into account, or H3 – both instrumental and structural power 
contributed in some substantial degree to the outcome.51 If H1 holds, we expect 
to discover evidence that business’s political engagement (either anticipated or 
actually undertaken) affected policy decisions, whereas if H2 holds, we anticipate 
discovering evidence that policymakers were concerned over a reform’s effect on 
investment; if H3 holds, we expect both types of evidence. As such, careful empiri-
cal work allows us to identify parallel or mutually reinforcing contributions of 
both types of power acting within a single case.
4   Business power in relation to other political 
considerations: electoral incentives and 
popular mobilization
Business power is not necessarily the only relevant consideration for policymak-
ers; electoral incentives and pressure from non-elite societal actors (popular 
sectors loosely speaking) also shape policy outcomes. Electoral incentives can 
counteract business power, particularly when issues are salient among voters, 
competition between the main political contenders is strong, and elections are 
proximate.52 These conditions make business’s instrumental power less effec-
tive, and policymakers are more likely to deviate from business interests. Even 
right parties for which business is a core constituency will occasionally support 
policies that business dislikes to attract a broader electorate.53 Policymakers may 
also pay less attention to structural power when the above conditions prevail; 
however, concern over investment will likely resume precedence once electoral 
periods have ended.54
51 This is essentially the approach I apply across multiple episodes of tax reform (or non-reform) 
in Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia (Fairfield 2015).
52 E.g. Culpepper (2011); Jacobs and Shapiro (2000).
53 Gibson (1996).
54 See Campello (2015) on candidates switching to market friendly policies once elected, or even 
prior to election when markets react strongly against leftist campaign platforms.
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When business power is strong, however, deviations from business prefer-
ences driven by electoral incentives tend to be modest. Many factors mitigate 
the countervailing pressure of public opinion; strong partisan identities, cross-
cutting voter preferences, charismatic linkages, and clientelism all create oppor-
tunities for politicians to win votes even if their policy positions on issues that 
matter to business deviate from median-voter preferences.55 In the realm of taxa-
tion, public opinion has had only marginal effects in Latin America when busi-
ness power is strong, even on high salience issues like Chile’s 2005 copper royalty 
initiatives.56
Demands from mobilized popular sectors, including labor unions and social 
movements, create much stronger incentives for policymakers to disregard busi-
ness interests.57 Popular mobilization can counterbalance or even overwhelm 
business power, as policymakers struggle to restore order and governability or 
even remain in power. Popular mobilization becomes more likely to overwhelm 
business power as disruptive capacity, scale, duration, and frequency of protest 
increase. Bolivia’s 2005 hydrocarbon royalty illustrates this dynamic; demands 
from below in a context of massive mobilization and extreme instability drove 
policymakers to enact a far more radical reform than would be predicted from 
assessing business power alone.58
When public opinion and popular demands conflict with business inter-
ests, issue salience and popular mobilization can be placed along an axis cor-
responding to how significantly policy deviates from business preferences,59 for 
a given level of business power. At the low salience end of the axis (Figure 2), 
business power is the dominant variable, and policymaking is characterized by 
elite politics. Where business power is strong, reforms are negotiated with busi-
ness representatives, or remain off the agenda. Where business power is weak, 
policymakers set the agenda independently of business interests, and business 
plays a minimal role in the subsequent policy process.
As issue salience increases, elite politics becomes conditioned by public 
opinion, and electoral incentives may motivate politicians to deviate from busi-
ness preferences. Whereas reform advocates often aim to mobilize public support 
and capitalize on heightened issue salience,60 business opponents use their 
instrumental power to frame issues in ways that undercut public support or 
55 E.g. Luna (2014).
56 Fairfield (2015: chap. 4).
57 See Garay (Accepted for publication); Fairfield and Garay (2013) for elaboration.
58 Fairfield (2015: chap. 8).
59 For a similar treatment focusing exclusively on salience, see Culpepper (2011: p. 190).
60 See Fairfield (2015: chaps. 2, 4) on tax reform strategies. 
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reduce public engagement. For example, business may convert a redistributive 
issue into a debate on complex technical or legal issues, which voters are less 
likely to understand or care about (see Section 5). Business may also try to move 
policymaking into arenas where public opinion matters less, such as constitu-
tional courts or regulatory agencies.61 If these strategies are ineffective or infeasi-
ble, business may accept modest reform to preclude a rising tide of anti-business 
sentiment, as occurred in Chile when the 2010 earthquake created unexpected 
revenue needs for reconstruction.62
Proceeding toward the right along the horizontal axis in Figure 2, we enter the 
realm of popular mobilization, where politicians deviate more significantly from 
business interests and popular demands can shape the agenda. Business power 
is counterbalanced most effectively when popular sectors actively mobilize on 
the issue at hand during the policymaking process (holding constant the level of 
mobilizational capacity). In such cases, popular mobilization may become the 
dominant variable in policymaking. During such times of extraordinary politics, 
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Figure 2: Business power, issue salience, popular mobilization, and deviation from business 
preferences.
61 On shifting between formal and informal institutional arenas, see Culpepper (2011: p. 190), on 
venue shopping more broadly see Hacker, Pierson, and Thelen (2013).
62 Fairfield (2015: chap. 9).
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business will be much less effective at shaping policy outcomes, even if instru-
mental and/or structural power is strong.63 Policymakers may even risk or toler-
ate disinvestment for the sake of preserving social peace and political order. In 
some cases, business may strategically acquiesce to significant policy change to 
preclude renewed or escalated protest. If the policy agenda is more radical, open 
battles may ensue between powerful business actors and popular sectors, as 
occurred in Chile under Allende and Bolivia during the 1980s.64 It should also be 
noted that while business will tend to lose more when policymakers face popular 
mobilization (holding constant the level of business power), if business power 
and countervailing mobilization are both strong, there may be significant uncer-
tainty about which side will prevail, and outcomes for any single policymaking 
episode may be difficult to predict.
5  Chile’s 2014 tax reform
The center-left Bachelet administration’s 2014 tax reform represents a dramatic 
break with Chile’s prior record of minimal tax policy change in a context of strong 
business power. This case illustrates the significant impact that popular mobili-
zation can have in counterbalancing business power and creating space for redis-
tributive reform. At the same time, however, structural power, in conjunction 
with (weakened) instrumental power, helped curtail the government’s original 
more radical reform plans. This section begins with an overview of earlier tax 
politics and the student movement’s role in paving the way for the 2014 reform. I 
then focus on the role that structural power played in helping business win con-
cessions during the debate in congress.
During the first two decades after Chile’s democratic transition, the govern-
ing center-left coalition was able to legislate at most modest tax increases despite 
recurrent revenue needs (Figure 3: 1991–2009). I argue elsewhere that business’s 
strong instrumental power consistently removed significant tax increases from 
the agenda; executive-branch policymakers anticipated lengthy political battles 
that were not worth the effort and/or would end in defeat.65 Business’s instrumen-
tal power arose primarily from partisan linkages to right parties with substantial 
63 If reforms demanded by popular sectors provoke substantial disinvestment, policymakers 
may eventually revoke them when the damage becomes clear or when popular sectors have de-
mobilized. 
64 Conaghan and Malloy (1994).
65 Fairfield (2010, 2015).
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representation in congress and from strong peak associations that coordinated 
lobbying across sectors. Structural power tended to play at most a background 
role; interview evidence indicates that concern over investor responses contrib-
uted to removing some initiatives from the agenda, yet business’s instrumental 
power was the more consistent and predominant factor explaining the center-
left’s reluctance to pursue reform. During this period, taxation was generally a 
low salience, elite-dominated policy area; occasional electoral incentives pro-
duced only minor deviations from business preferences for minimal taxation 
(Figure 3: 2005).
Massive student protests in 2011–2012 during Chile’s first right-wing presi-
dency ruptured the status quo and created an opening for much more significant 
policy change.66 Large-scale social mobilization – a factor that had been absent 
in Chile since democratization – counterbalanced business power. The students’ 
core concern was education, but when the Piñera administration dismissed their 
demands as too expensive, they responded by explicitly calling on the govern-
ment to tax economic elites. Piñera responded with modest reform intended to 
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66 Fairfield and Garay (2013); Fairfield (2015).
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close the debate, but the issues of taxation and inequality, along with education, 
assumed prominent positions on the national agenda (Figure 3: 2012). Politicians 
who otherwise prioritized business interests faced electoral incentives to moder-
ate their stance and respond to popular demands on these now highly salient 
issues, and major structural changes to income taxation were proposed for the 
first time in two decades.
The right’s poor performance in the 2013 congressional elections further 
altered the political landscape by weakening business’s instrumental power 
based on partisan linkages. The right won only 17 out of 38 seats, making parti-
san linkages much less effective for protecting business interests. Organization 
remained strong, and business could mobilize other resources like media access 
and technical expertise. However, the right parties no longer held enough seats 
to block legislation that business opposed in the senate. Given this consideration, 
along with a credible threat of renewed popular mobilization, business came to 
view compromise on taxation as strategically imperative for buying social peace 
and precluding escalated challenges to the neoliberal economic model.
The newly elected Bachelet administration seized the opportunity to propose 
a tax system overhaul (Figure 3: 2014). The Pinochet dictatorship established an 
integrated income tax – the corporate tax (20% in 2012) served as a credit against 
personal income taxes that capital owners owed upon receiving dividends or dis-
tributed profits. Since the top marginal personal income tax rate was much higher 
(40%), capital owners left most of their profits in the firm, where they paid only 
the low corporate tax. While this system was intended to promote investment, the 
large gap between the corporate and personal income tax rates also stimulated 
massive tax avoidance and evasion, which meant that in practice, capital owners 
in the top 1% paid low effective tax rates – roughly 15%.67 To eliminate these prob-
lems, the government proposed an innovative imputed profits tax regime – all 
profits, whether reinvested or distributed to owners, would enter the individual 
income tax base. The extensive reform package included multiple other measures 
to curtail evasion and avoidance, many of which were considered in prior years 
but deemed politically infeasible given business’s strong instrumental power. 
Overall, the government aimed to raise an impressive 3% GDP.
Although the government managed to move the proposal quickly though the 
lower house of congress with minor modifications, the Finance Ministry drafted 
a compromise bill in the senate that introduced significant changes. Most impor-
tantly, the imputed profits regime was made “voluntary.” Taxpayers could instead 
opt into a partially de-integrated income tax system with a 27% corporate tax, 
67 Fairfield and Jorratt (2015).
Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/26/15 3:58 PM
Structural power in comparative political economy      431
where 65% of the tax paid by the firm is creditable against the personal income 
tax. This compromise still entails a major tax increase on the wealthiest Chile-
ans, and the government maintains that it preserves the 3% GDP revenue target. 
However, the imputed profits tax system would have more effectively eliminated 
evasion and avoidance and was arguably more equitable and progressive. Moreo-
ver, critics warned that the complications of administering two parallel income 
tax systems could create new opportunities for evasion, undermining revenue 
yield and progressivity.
Business power played an important role in motivating the executive branch 
to cede on the imputed profits regime, originally designated as the “heart” of 
the reform. Structural power clearly did not act at the agenda formulation stage. 
The authors of the reform were not concerned over its potential impact on invest-
ment, because they viewed the gap between the personal and corporate tax 
rates as a pure incentive for tax avoidance and evasion (Figure 4A: T1), and the 
Finance Ministry strongly defended the proposal against arguments to the con-
trary. However, structural power came into play once the bill entered the senate. 
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gap stimulates evasion
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Figure 4: Structural power during different stages of Chile’s 2014 tax reform.
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Perceived structural power, at least partially enhanced by instrumental power, 
contributed to dissent within the governing coalition. Sustained conflict and 
extended debate over the reform in the context of deepening economic slowdown 
helped compel the administration to prioritize compromise, not only to secure 
votes in the senate, but also to improve the investment climate.
Whereas the Finance Ministry maintained that Chile’s integrated income tax 
stimulated evasion and avoidance, prominent economists associated with prior 
center-left administrations embraced the alternative view that this system, with its 
large gap between the corporate and personal income tax rates and deferred taxa-
tion of capital income, was in fact critical for promoting investment (Figure 4B: 
T2). Three former finance ministers publicly expressed concern over the reform’s 
impact on investment, criticizing the imputed profits tax regime and arguing that 
if the integrated income tax system were eliminated, creating alternative invest-
ment incentives was imperative.68 In essence, these economists perceived strong 
structural power with respect to the government’s proposal, given the way that 
they modeled investor responses. Although which view is “objectively” correct 
is a matter of debate, studies conducted by the Chilean tax agency and research 
on capital taxation in the US supported the Finance Ministry’s original position 
that the imputed profits regime would have had only modest, short-term effects 
on investment.69 However, dissent from these prominent center-left economists 
undermined the Finance Ministry’s position and helped sow concern among the 
more conservative wing of the governing center-left coalition (primarily Christian 
Democrats).70
Business advanced similar structural-power arguments against the imputed 
profits regime, which they adamantly opposed. The tone, intensity, and central-
ity of these arguments varied over time and across sectors as business tried to 
refine its opposition strategy. Early during the debate, the head of the industrial 
association (SOFOFA71) issued a strident warning: “If the projects businesses are 
evaluating become unprofitable because of tax increases, they will be carried out 
without doubt – in other countries.”72 These words reflected business’s defensive 
position following the right parties’ electoral demise and widespread concern 
within the business sector that the peak associations had lost their capacity to 
68 Aninat, Marfán, and Velasco; www.senado.cl/appsenado/templates/tramitacion/index.
php?boletin_ini=9290-05#.
69 Yagan (2014); www.senado.cl/appsenado/templates/tramitacion/index.php?boletin_
ini=9290-05#.
70 Interview E.
71 Sociedad de Fomento Fabril.
72 El Mercurio, March 21, 2014.
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influence public policy.73 However, SOFOFA’s declarations were not only received 
poorly by the government and the public but were also interpreted by many 
business leaders as unnecessarily confrontational and counterproductive given 
the new political context.74 One informant explained: “If we oppose the reform, 
saying it will damage the economy and hurt jobs, we will hurt ourselves because 
the reform will pass, and business will be accused of protecting its own interests 
– wanting to pay less taxes, refusing to contribute to education, and trying to 
maintain inequality.”75 Business opposition subsequently shifted to impugning 
the imputed profits regime as unconstitutional and too complex to implement – 
strategies for reframing a salient redistributive debate as a technical issue beyond 
the grasp of voters.
Once the reform entered the senate, however, structural-power arguments 
resumed a prominent place in business’ counteroffensive. The president of Chile’s 
encompassing peak association (CPC76) opened his remarks to the senate finance 
committee by highlighting the tax system’s importance for promoting investment 
and warning that the reform’s “radical changes” would affect “economic growth, 
employment, and salaries.”77 SOFOFA, the mining sector, and the trade and com-
merce association focused their extensive Senate presentations on the reform’s 
purportedly adverse effects on investment and growth. SOFOFA’s presentation 
was reminiscent of its president’s early outspoken assertions. After attributing 
Chile’s three decades of progress to the integrated tax system, the presentation 
concluded: “it is difficult to think that a [proposed] tax system that has created 
such profound concern could foster growth and form the basis for economic and 
social development over the next 30 years.”78
Privileged media access stemming from ownership of the major media 
outlets helped business instrumentally enhance structural power. Chile’s news-
paper market is a duopoly controlled by El Mercurio, owned by the Edwards 
family, and the conglomerate Copesa, owned by Álvaro Saieh.79 The press reit-
erated and amplified business’s warnings of reduced growth and investment, 
along with multiple other arguments against the reform including its purported 
73 Interview A.
74 Interview E.
75 Interview B.
76 Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio.
77 Andrés Santa Cruz, June 16, 2014. www.senado.cl/appsenado/templates/tramitacion/index.
php?boletin_ini=9290-05#.
78 July 2, 2014, www.senado.cl/appsenado/templates/tramitacion/index.php?boletin_ini= 
9290-05#.
79 Becerra and Mastrini (2009); Schneider (2013); Boas (2013).
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negative impact on small business and the middle class. Favorable commen-
taries were published, but negative coverage was more extensive and more 
prominently placed in Chile’s major newspapers. Opinion polls suggest that the 
media campaign achieved results. In early June when the senate was begin-
ning its hearings, a widely publicized CADEM poll reported 49% of respond-
ents identifying the reform’s primary effect as raising consumer prices (26%), 
increasing unemployment (14%), or slowing growth (9%).80 Adimark likewise 
reported that 47% believed the tax reform would reduce employment and affect 
growth.81 Public opinion would have at most an indirect affect on legislators. 
However, these figures likely strengthened the position of dissenters within 
the center-left and gave the government cause for concern in conjunction with 
signs that the administration was loosing the broader battle for public support 
on the reform.82
Chile’s economic slowdown also fostered structural power concerns. The 
Bachelet administration initially projected growth of at least 4.9% for 2014, 
but in mid-June while the tax reform was in the senate, the Central Bank 
released reports anticipating growth of only 3%.83 Firms interviewed for the 
Central Bank’s Business Perceptions Report indicated that the tax initiative 
was among the factors motivating them to refrain from undertaking new 
investments and/or postpone planned projects.84 Business association leaders 
reinforced the message that the tax initiative was exacerbating the slowdown, 
although they were careful to acknowledge that multiple factors were depress-
ing investment.85
Economists with ties to business and the right were less circumspect in their 
claims, aiming to instrumentally enhance structural power by linking the eco-
nomic slowdown directly to the tax reform and thereby shaping how policymak-
ers interpreted the disinvestment signal. For example, Piñera’s former economy 
minister declared: “This new [tax] regime … is causing paralysis in investment 
and employment decisions… the effect will be between 2% and 4% of GPD in 
80 Cadem No 21, June 9, 2014. “Track seminal de Opinión Pública.”
81 El Mercurio June 18, 2014.
82 Tercera, July 13, 2014. Widely reported, inaccurate charges that the reform would affect a wide 
swath of Chileans also took hold among the public. CEP (July 2014) found 29% of respondents 
believed the reform would worsen their economic situation; CADEM (June 9, 2014) reported that 
fully 68% believed the reform would hurt the “middle class.”
83 El Mercurio, June 23, 2014.
84 Informe de Percepciones de Negocios (August 2014), based on 100 interviews between 
June 30 and July 29. http://www.bcentral.cl/publicaciones/otras/otras48.htm.
85 CPC senate presentation, June 16; El Mercurio, June 11, 2014; Diario Financiero June 19, 2014.
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reduced investment.”86 These arguments probably did not alter the executive 
branch’s assessment of the tax reform’s medium- to long-term impact on invest-
ment, especially considering that many independent economists attributed the 
investment slowdown primarily to international factors, reduced mining activity 
due to falling copper prices and rising energy costs, and completion of large-scale 
construction projects initiated after the 2010 earthquake.87 However, designing 
new measures to stimulate investment became a central issue in discussions 
between the Finance Ministry and senators from both the opposition and govern-
ing coalitions.88
Press accounts suggested that concern over growth and investment ulti-
mately motivated President Bachelet to mandate a negotiated agreement across 
the political spectrum.89 In the weeks following the agreement, the Finance Min-
ister publicly acknowledged that protracted debate on the reform was contribut-
ing to the environment of investment uncertainty.90 Similarly, Socialist Senator 
Montes recounted: “the economic deceleration made the negotiated agreement 
necessary” for the sake of improving the investment climate.91
Readers might find it surprising that projected growth of 3% stimulated such 
concern among Chilean policymakers, considering the international context. 
Many OECD countries were struggling to recover from recession; growth in the 
UK and US was just under 2% in 2013. Leading Latin American economies also 
experienced sluggish growth: 2.5% in Brazil, 3% in Argentina, and 1.1% in Mexico. 
Yet the Chilean slowdown motivated a shift in government priorities and renewed 
attention to business interests. This case highlights the context sensitivity of struc-
tural power and its frequent relationship to economic cycles. Chilean policymak-
ers are acutely attuned to changes in growth rates, and structural power in Chile 
tends to be stronger not only during recessions, but also during mere slowdowns, 
or even periods when growth fails to match expectations or desired targets.
86 Juan Andrés Fontaine, quoted in Diario Financiero July 3, 2014. Fontaine was a longtime 
member of right-wing think tank Libertad y Desarrollo which has close ties to big business. 
Observers on the left directly accused business and the right of “taking advantage of the poor 
economic indicators to reinforce the idea that the [tax] reform must be halted” (Mostrador, Sep-
tember 8, 2014).
87 Mostrador, September 8, 2014; Socialist Party informant, September 27, 2014 personal com-
munication. Meanwhile, among governing-coalition legislators, structural-power concerns 
voiced by former center-left finance ministers probably carried more weight than the right’s ar-
guments.
88 E.g. Diario Financiero June 25, 2014.
89 Tercera, July 13, 2014.
90 Ibid.
91 El Mercurio, August 16, 2014.
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Structural power was by no means the only factor contributing to the negoti-
ated compromise. Instrumental power based on technical expertise also helped 
business gain ground against the reform. Business associations marshaled an 
army of tax consultants and sympathetic technical advisors from their studies 
departments and the professional community more broadly to argue against 
the reform’s legality and administrative feasibility. The barrage of criticism on 
these fronts overwhelmed governing-coalition senators and elicited serious con-
cerns.92 The tax agency director subsequently defended the reform’s feasibility in 
an extensive presentation to the senate, emphasizing that the new system would 
actually be administratively simpler, but by then substantial damage had already 
been done. Moreover, the government failed to assuage concerns regarding con-
stitutionality. In an effort to shift to a non-majoritarian venue, the right threat-
ened to take the reform to the constitutional court, which could have seriously 
delayed implementation even if the ruling favored the government.93 This factor 
likely weighed heavily, given the administration’s express goal of enacting the 
reform in time for the new revenue estimates to be included in the 2014 budget 
law.
Had civil society actively mobilized to support Bachelet’s original proposal, 
the administration might have been in a stronger position to defend the reform. 
However, the student movement focused on education reform – which was 
being drafted while the tax reform was debated – in contrast to its more expan-
sive agenda in 2011–2012. The labor unions, which had mobilized alongside the 
student movement, supported the tax proposal.94 Yet like the students, the unions 
were more active on the issue most directly affecting their members: reform of 
Chile’s highly-restrictive labor code.
While the mass mobilizations of 2011 and 2012 counterbalanced business 
power and dramatically shifted the policy agenda away from business prefer-
ences towards more equity-enhancing, statist reforms, demobilization on the 
issue of taxation opened space for business to make gains at the margins during 
later stages of policymaking.95 Yet even though the reform ultimately signed into 
92 Interview C.
93 Socialist Party informant, September 27, 2014 personal communication. A governing-coali-
tion legislator (C) expressed the following concerns: “I could be convinced that the reform is 
constitutional. But there is a Constitutional Tribunal, and if its thinks differently, we have a seri-
ous problem, and the reform falls. That has a big political cost for the government.”
94 CUT in Finance Committee; interview D.
95 A union informant noted this effect with regard to the student movement as follows: “they 
have been absent in this [tax] debate, even though they were the first ones to instigate the issue…
without doubt this is an element that has allowed the most retrograde politicians and especially 
the business sector to carry out a very aggressive offensive against the reform.”
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law did not achieve the highly progressive structural overhaul of the tax system 
original proposed by the government, the compromise legislation nevertheless 
significantly altered the integrated tax system that business had long defended 
as sacrosanct.
6  Conclusion
Chile’s 2014 tax reform illustrates several important points about structural 
power. First, policymakers’ perceptions matter. Projecting how market actors will 
respond to policy change and/or ascertaining why they have reacted in a par-
ticular way is not an exact science. Experts may disagree on how significantly a 
reform will affect investment and how that in turn will affect growth and devel-
opment, even if they have similar technical training, belong to the same political 
coalition, and share similar goals.
Second, the Chilean case illustrates the potential for instrumental power to 
enhance structural power. In some instances business may be able to deliber-
ately foster or augment concern over the market response to policies they dislike 
through the sheer persuasiveness of their arguments. Yet concrete sources of 
instrumental power like privileged media access, technical expertise, or ties to 
important political parties make structural-power arguments more likely to take 
hold.
Third, structural power need not operate exclusively at the agenda formula-
tion stage. In the Chilean case, structural power acted much later in the policy 
process because policymakers who were not involved in drafting the legislation 
but who were relevant for enacting the legislation anticipated that the reform 
would hurt investment. Moreover, as the economy became more sluggish, concern 
regarding the reform’s contribution to low investor spirits spread.
Relatedly, structural power in some cases can play a secondary role to 
instrumental power in protecting business interests. In Chile, structural power 
became more salient after business’s instrumental power declined (due to the 
right parties’ loss of seats in congress). Weakened instrumental power allowed 
more radical policy changes to emerge on the agenda – changes that precisely by 
virtue of being more radical were more likely to stimulate concerns over market 
responses, or in others words, reforms inherently more likely to encounter strong 
structural power.
Finally, the Chilean case illustrates the importance of analyzing electoral 
incentives and popular mobilization in conjunction with business power. High 
issue salience occasionally facilitated enactment of reforms that otherwise were 
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not feasible given strong business power through 2010, yet those reforms remained 
modest. In contrast, popular mobilization effected a major shift in Chilean poli-
tics that dramatically expanded the tax agenda and created an opportunity for 
progressive policymakers to initiate major policy change. While structural power 
helped slow the pace of change, it certainly did not prevent change. In other cases 
where mobilized popular sectors continue to actively demand reforms, structural 
power may have little effect; even if policymakers anticipate a negative invest-
ment response, satisfying other constituencies may take precedence.
Analyzing structural power can be labor-intensive, particularly when infor-
mation about agenda formulation and subsequent government-business nego-
tiations is not a matter of public record. And it may not always be possible to 
uncover evidence allowing definitive adjudication regarding the relative impor-
tance of instrumental power vs. structural power in a given case – business often 
has multiple sources of power that may act simultaneously, especially in Latin 
America’s highly unequal market democracies where large business groups are 
both politically connected and economically dominant. However, endeavoring to 
ascertain which mechanisms of influence operate is an important aspect of com-
parative analysis – as social scientist studying the convoluted and often opaque 
world of business and politics, we must come to grips with multiple, complex 
causality. Moreover, so-doing can lead to insights on opportunities and strategies 
for promoting equity-enhancing development.
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